Choosing monetary sequences: theory and experimental evidence by Manzini, Paola et al.
Choosing Monetary Sequences: Theory and
Experimental Evidence
Paola Manzini
University of St. Andrews and IZA
Marco Mariotti
University of St. Andrews
Luigi Mittone
University of Trento
This version: November 2009
Abstract
We formulate and investigate experimentally a model of how individuals choose be-
tween time sequences of monetary outcomes. The model assumes that a decision-maker
uses, sequentially, two criteria to screen options. Each criterion only permits a decision
between some pairs of options, while the other options are incomparable according to
that criterion. When the rst criterion is not decisive, the decision maker resorts to the
second criterion to select an alternative. We nd that: 1) traditional economic models
based on discounting alone cannot explain a signicant (almost 30%) proportion of the
data no matter how much variability in the discount functions is allowed; 2) our model,
despite considering only a specic (exponential) form of discounting, can explain the
data much better solely thanks to the use of the secondary criterion; 3) our model
explains certain specic patterns in the choices of the irrationalpeople. We reject
the hypothesis that anomalous behaviour is due simply to random mistakesaround
the basic predictions of discounting theories: deviations are not random and there are
clear systematic patterns of association between irrationalchoices.
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Most economic decisions involve a time dimension, hence the need for a reliable model of time
preferences. The standard exponential discounting model for time preferences has been the
object of strong, evidence-led criticisms in the last few years. Various discounting anomalies
have been identied. Some of these anomalies do not contradict the basic maximisation
hypothesis in economic theory, and can be addressed simply by changes in the functional
form of the objective function which agents are supposed to maximize.1
But other observed violations of the standard model are more fundamental, because they
seem to contradict the basic assumption of maximization of any economically reasonable
objective function. One of these hard anomalies is the striking phenomenon of negative time
preferences. Notably Loewenstein and Prelec [10] (also Loewenstein and Prelec [12]) have
argued that there is evidence of negative time preferences when individuals choose between
sequences of outcomes (e.g. wage proles in a survey by Loewenstein and Sicherman [13]
and discomfort sequences in Varey and Kahneman [25]). Their empirical ndings lead them
to conclude that To most persons, a deteriorating series of utility levels is a rather close
approximation to the least attractive of all possible patterns(p. 347). In a more recent
survey, Frederick, Loewenstein, ODonoghue [7] emphasise once again that In studies of
discounting that involve choices between two outcomes... positive discounting is the norm.
Research examining preferences over sequences of outcomes, however, has generally found
that people prefer improving sequences to declining sequences (p. 363). These ndings
obviously cannot be explained by hyperbolic discounting, or indeed by any other form of
positive discounting. Therefore they pose a more formidable challenge for the economic
modeler of decision-making over time sequences.
This paper has three main aims:
1. We propose a theory of preferences over monetary time sequences that provides a
possible explanation for the observed anomalies, while at the same time keeping simple
1The best-known example of a soft anomaly in choice over time is preference reversal between date-
outcome pairs, which can be explained by the now popular model of hyperbolic discounting, as well as
by other models (see e.g. Manzini and Mariotti [17], Noor [18], Read [19], Rubinstein [21]). Recall that
preference reversal denotes the situation whereby the preference for a smaller reward obtained sooner over a
larger later reward is reversed when the obtainment of both rewards is pushed forward by the same amount
of time. We survey the topic of anomalies in Manzini Mariotti [16].
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exponential (positive) discounting as one of its core elements.
2. We investigate to what extent conclusions on the preference for increasingness based
on survey ndings (e.g. Loewenstein and Sicherman [13]) are supported in a laboratory
experiment in which subjects received real money payments we nd mixed evidence
on this.
3. We uncover some new clear patterns in choice (beside preference for increasing se-
quences) which are consistent with our theory but inconsistent with pure discounting
models.
While experimental investigations of choices over date-outcome pairs form a small but
non-negligible literature, experimental investigations of choices over reward sequences are
extremely thin on the ground in the economics literature, especially with nancially mo-
tivated subjects.2 In the experimental part of the paper, we ask subjects to make binary
choices among all possible pairs of monetary sequences, out of a set of an increasing, con-
stant, decreasing and jump(i.e. end e¤ect) pattern in a paid condition (where subjects do
indeed receive the sums corresponding to the sequence chosen).3
The theoretical model we propose is a hybrid modelwhich combines the traditional
consistent discounting theory with a heuristics component. More specically, in order to
rank monetary reward sequences, the decision maker looks rst at the standard exponential
discounting criterion; however, preferences are incomplete, so that sequences are only par-
tially ordered by the criterion. In other words, sometimes the decision maker is able to make
a trade-o¤ between the time and the outcome dimension, and sometimes he is not. When
he is, he does so in a time-consistent way.4
We postulate a very simple (two-parameter, in the specication used for the experiment)
interval order structure to formalize preference incompleteness. In this structure, preferences
2The literature includes Chapman [4], Gigliotti and Sopher [8], Guyse, Keller and Epple [9]. The last two
papers in particular show that the domain of choice is rather important, in the sense that there are di¤erences
in observed choices depending on whether or not the sequences are of money, or health or environmental
outcomes. On this point see also Read and Powell [20].
3As a robustness check, we also run additional treatments varying the amount of the payments.
4This idea originated in Manzini and Mariotti [17]s model of choice between date/outcome pairs. We
showed that in that context a simple model can account for major anomalies both soft and hard, such as
preference reversal and cyclical choice patterns.
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are described by two functions, a utility function u and a vagueness function , which com-
bine additively. A sequence a is denitely chosen over another sequence b if the discounted
utility of a exceeds the discounted utility of b by at least  (b). When sequences cannot be
compared by means of discounted utilities, the decision-maker is assumed to focus on one
prominent attribute of the sequences. This prominent attribute ranks (maybe partially) the
sequences and allows a specic choice to be made. This latter aspect of the model is in the
spirit of Tversky, Sattath and Slovic [24]s prominence hypothesis. The attribute may be
context dependent. In the date-outcome pairs case, for example, objects have two obvious
attributes that may become prominent, the date and the outcome: in that case two natural
models emerge according to whether date or outcome is looked at rst. We stress that, at the
abstract level, the only departure from the standard choice theoretic approach is that our
decision makers behavior is described by combining sequentially two possibly incomplete
preference orderings, as in Manzini and Mariotti [14], instead of using directly a complete
preference ordering.
In the case of reward sequences, previous experimental evidence suggests that the general
trend of the sequence (increasing or decreasing) is relevant to make decisions. However, in our
case the data provide much weaker evidence than Loewenstein and Prelec [10]s in support
of their view that sequences of outcomes that decline in value are greatly disliked(p. 351).
We nd that, even in the simple decision problems we study, where monetary sequences can
be clearly ordered according to their trends, simply choosing according to the heuristics that
favors an increasing trend, though compatible with a non negligible proportion of choices,
does a rather poor job at explaining the data. The modal subject and choice is rational,
in the sense of being compatible with positive time preference combined with preference for
income smoothing (concave utility function).
So although there is a problem for pure discounting standard theory, its magnitude is
not of the scale the existing literature suggests. When there are no a¤ective factors involved
(such as, for example, the sense of dread for choices relating to health, or the sense of failure
involved in a decreasing wage prole), some theory of positive discounting can provide a
rough approximation of the choice patterns.
Nonetheless, it is still true that a disturbingly high number of people (around 30%) choose
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in ways that are incompatible with any form of positive discounting (exponential, hyperbolic
or otherwise). This proportion of people violating such a basic economic assumption (that
good things should come early and bad things should come late) is unsatisfactory from
the point of view of the descriptive adequacy of standard theory. It suggests that other
mechanisms beyond discounting are at work. So we believe that Loewenstein and Prelecs
pioneering ndings do capture, beside a¤ective factors, some of the heuristic considerations
that people use when evaluating neutrally(without a¤ects) money sequences. However,
those considerations become really e¤ective in explaining the deviant choices only when used
as a secondary criterion, rather than directly. The very basic two-parameter version of our
model is far superior, in order to explain observed choices, both to any pure discounting
model and to a direct heuristics-based model. In addition, when specialized to date-outcome
pairs comparisons, it can also explain other observed anomalies both soft and hard.
Most importantly, while our model nests the standard exponential discounting model
as a special case (when vagueness is su¢ ciently small), it does not include the hyperbolic
discounting model as a special case. Nevertheless, our theory is in principle able to accom-
modate more patterns of choice: so of course one would expect a more general theory to
be able to explain more data. In order to address this issue, we use Seltens [23] measure
of predictive success, and show that our model performs also proportionally better than any
generic discounting model (including hyperbolic discounting), no matter the degree of con-
cavity of the utility function. We obtain these results by comparing the explanatory power
of two alternative classes of theoretical models: that of vague time preferences and that of
standard discounting models. It is this comparison, rather than the estimation of discount
factors,5 that we seek to address in this paper.
One important feature of our analysis is that we delve quite deeply into the analysis of
irrationalchoices. First of all, a caveat. We use the terms rationaland irrationalby
implicitly identifying a monetary sequence with the consumption sequence associated with
it by immediately spending the money when it becomes available. Otherwise, one could not
5As explained very well in Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutstrom [3], the careful estimation of discount
factors would require the simultaneous estimation of risk aversion, in turn requiring to make specic assump-
tions on the functional forms for decision makersutility functions. As we seek to compare large classes of
competing models, this goes counter to narrowing down to a specic functional form for the utility function,
thus making it impossible to estimate discount factors.
5
justify as rationaleven the choice of a constant sequence over a decreasing sequence (any
consumption smoothing a¤orded by a constant sequence is also a¤orded by a decreasing
sequence with the same total value). So this terminology, which should be viewed as merely
conventional rather than substantial, errs on the side of caution in identifying irrational
sequences.
We nd that the observed pattern of irrationality is systematic. In general, our data
reveal some interesting and non-obvious patterns of association in choice, on which standard
theory (and simple increasingness heuristics) are completely silent. Among our ndings are
the following two: (i) there is association between certain types of rational choices and irra-
tional choices (those who prefer a decreasing to a constant sequence are disproportionately
concentrated among those who also prefer a constant to an increasing sequence); (ii) there
is association between irrational choices of a di¤erent type (choosing an increasing over a
decreasing sequence is very strongly associated with choosing an increasing over a constant
sequence). Such patterns are what one would expect if our model were true. They cannot
be generated by any discounting model.
2 A Model of Intertemporal Choice
Let X indicate a set of money amounts and u : X ! R be an instantaneous monotonic
increasing utility function. Let T = f0; 1; 2; : : :; T g be a nite set of dates. The set of
alternatives A is a subset of the set of nite sequences of outcomes, i.e. A  XT . A typical
alternative is denoted a = ((a1; t1) ; :::; (ak; tk)), with a1; :::; ak 2 X and t1; :::; tk 2 T , and
ti > ti0 for i > i0.
Recall that in discounting models sequences are evaluated by means of a discounting
function  : T ! (0; 1). The discounted utility at time 0 of sequence a = ((a1; t1) ; :::; (ak; tk))
is ki=1 (ti)u (ai); with exponential discounting we have that  (t) = 
t for some  2 (0; 1).
With hyperbolic discounting instead  (t) is a hyperbolic function of the type (1 + at)( g=a),
with g and a being two preference parameters, and in the very popular (   ) version of
hyperbolic discounting the following specication is used:  (0) = 1 and  (t) = t for t > 0,
with , 2 (0; 1) (see Loewenstein and Prelec [11]).
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The model we propose uses as a primitive a binary preference relation% of the individual
on A constructed as follows:
1. Primary criterion. There exists a primary criterion P1, which is a possibly incomplete
strict ordering. On the basis of the primary criterion the individual makes (possibly
partial) comparisons between sequences.
2. Vagueness function. There may be pairs of alternatives for which the primary crite-
rion alone is not discriminating enough. This lack of discrimination is captured by a
vagueness function : A! R+.
3. Secondary criterion. In the case where the primary criterion does not rank alternatives
(i.e. the decision maker is vague), and only in this case, a secondary criterion is used.
The secondary criterion P2 is just a (possibly partial) strict ordering on A.
We interpret P1 as resolving comparisons for which the trade-o¤ between outcomes and
time yields, in the perception of the individual, a decisive advantage to one of the alterna-
tives. The trade-o¤s involved are assumed to be resolved by P1 in a time-consistentway:
they coincide with the standard ones based on exponentially discounted utility, with dis-
count factor  2 (0; 1).6 If the present, exponentially discounted utility of the higher value
alternative a does not exceed the utility of the lower value alternative b by at least  (b), we
say that the decision maker is vague. In this case a and b are not related by P1. Then the
decision between a and b is resolved based on the secondary criterion P2. We interpret it as
being based on one prominent attribute of the elements of A. In some contexts, as in the
case of date-outcome pairs or in the experiment presented below, the relevant attributes are
obvious; in other cases less so and the issue of what is an appropriate secondary criterion is
essentially empirical. We view the secondary criterion P2 as a primitive of the model just as
u,  or  are primitives in the simple version of the hyperbolic discounting model. We build
on the empirical evidence discussed previously and posit that the preference for increasing
sequences kicks only when resolving the vagueness of the decision maker; so we adopt a
preference for increasingess as our secondary criterion.
6As noted in the conclusions, other assumptions on P1 are also compatible with the data.
7
The (complete) relation % is derived by the combination of the (possibly incomplete)
primary and secondary criterion, as follows. Let  denote the strict binary preference
relation on A. We propose the following general model, for given u, ,  and P2:
For all a; b 2 A, we have a  b,
1. t
tu (at) > t
tu (bt) +  (bt) (Primary Criterion P1), or
2.
t
tu (at) 6 ttu (bt) +  (bt)
t
tu (bt) 6 ttu (at) +  (at)
and aP2b (Secondary Criterion P2)
(where the summations are taken over the appropriate range).
The model we propose here is grounded in previous work: the existence of two criteria
P1 and P2, applied sequentially to arrive at a choice can be justied at a more abstract level
- Manzini and Mariotti [14] provide an axiomatic foundation for an abstract choice function
(taken as a primitive) to be rationalisableby a two-stage procedure of the type specied in
this paper.7 The specialisation of P1 that we propose in this paper has quite conveniently
an additive form in which the vagueness term enters the formula. A few manipulations show
that this specialization can account for both cyclical behaviour in choice as well as other
patterns that cannot be accommodated in any discounting model.8 We pursue these points
further in section 4.
3 Experimental Design
Our objective in this experiment is to compare the explanatory power of alternative classes
of theoretical models: we do not wish to pin down any particular functional form, as this
would open up issues as to the suitability of the chosen specication for the problem at hand.
For example, if one wanted to consider a concave discounted utility function, why might a
Cobb-Douglas be more appropriate than a quasi-linear specication? Our approach frees us
7In Manzini and Mariotti [17] we provide a characterisation for the (   ) model used in this paper.
8Rubinstein [22] reports that subjects exhibited the following type of behavior: they chose $997 to
be received on November 1st over $1000 to be received on December 1st (they were impatient and
preferred smaller reward earlier rather than larger reward later) but chose the sequence of four pay-
ments of $1000 each to be paid on the rst day of April, June, October and December over the
sequence of four payments of $997 each available one month earlier. This choice pattern, incom-
patible with discounting models, can be accommodated within the (   ) model (see http://www.st-
andrews.ac.uk/~pm210/expsequencestechnical_and_data_appendix.pdf).
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from the need to estimate any functional form parameters, and allows us to proceed along a
di¤erent path.9 We will consider the large family of standard pure discounting theories where
the utility over date-outcome pairs is separable in the time and outcome components (i.e. for
outcome ai available at time ti, discounted utility is  (ti)u (ai)), and the utility for a stream
of date-outcome pairs is additively separable across periods (i.e. given by tkt=t1 (t)u (at)),
with the usual monotonicity and concavity properties. Similarly for the class of vagueness
models. In the experiment, we elicit choices between pairs of alternative remuneration plans;
given all possible combinations, and regardless of specic functional forms, as we detail
below, there will be only a subset of all possible choice patterns compatible with the family
of pure discounting theories. Similarly, only some of all possible patterns are compatible
with our vagueness model. Thus if the standard model is to be successful in explaining the
data, there must be only a handful of observed choice behaviours incompatible with such
theoretical framework. Similarly, a measure of success of our proposed alternative model
would have to show that a consistent proportion of the data falls in categories that are not
compatible with standard pure discounting theories, but allowable in the new model. In
addition, any successful model would have to be falsiable, i.e. at the theoretical level there
would have to be choice patterns incompatible with it, giving evidence a chance to contradict
the theory.
One potential di¢ culty is that the framework of vague time preferences does include
standard discounting as a particular case. As a consequence, it would not be surprising if
the vagueness family were to perform better than pure discounting theories at explaining
the data. To control for this fact, in comparing theories we will rely on Seltens index of
explanatory power, devised precisely to deal with such instances. As we will see, based on
this index one can proclaim a theory as more successful than another only if it accommodates
proportionally (as opposed as raw data) more data than the competitor.
In our approach, then, rather than pursuing the (point) estimation of specic functional
form parameters, we investigate the compatibility of our two competing area theories, or
rather of the subsets of the universe of possible choice patterns that they can accommodate,
with observed data. In this sense, we proceed in the spirit of traditional revealed preference
9See Abdellaoui, Attema and Bleichrodt [1] (and the literature therein) for a recent experimental estima-
tion of discount rates, which nds little evidence for hyperbolic discounting.
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analysis. An additional advantage of this line of attack is also that we do not have to impose
on our experimental subjects a long list of questions (which would be needed if we wanted
to estimate, say, individual discount rates), as in e¤ect only a limited number will be enough
for us to be able to make meaningful comparisons between competing families of theories.
These questions are detailed in the next sections.
Experiment
The experiments were carried out using the facilities of the Computable and Experimental
Economics Laboratory at the University of Trento, in Italy. In all, we ran 16 sessions.
Experimental subjects were recruited through bulletin board advertising from the students
of the University of Trento. Each sessions consisted of both male and female participants
in roughly equal proportions. The experiment was computerised, and each participant was
seated at an individual computer station, using separators so that subjects could not see the
choices made by other participants. Experimental sessions lasted an average of around 26
minutes, of which an average of 18 minutes of e¤ective play, with the shortest one lasting
approximately 16 minutes and the longest around 37 minutes. In our main treatment, the
PAY (for Paid) treatment, subjects were paid e5 showup fee and an additional e48 paid
in instalments depending on their choice (a total of 102 subjects in 9 sessions). In addition,
we ran two additional treatment as a robustness check. In the HYP (for hypothetical)
treatment subjects were only paid the e5 show up fee, whereas in the PAYL (for Paid,
low stakes) the total additional amount on top of the show up fee was e24.10 These were
carried out to check whether the amounts paid would make a di¤erence to observed choice
behaviour: a comparison between PAY and PAYL would allow us to check whether the size
of the real monetary payments produces any e¤ects; while a comparison between PAY and
HYP would allow us to check whether there is any di¤erence between real and hypotetical
payments. Since however the results we obtain in these additional treatment are qualitatively
similar to those for the main treatment, they are not reported here.11 At the beginning of the
10In all treatments the show up fee alone, for an average of less than thirty minutes long experimental
session, was higher than the hourly pay on campus, which is e8. At the time of the experiments the exchange
rate of the Euro was approximately e1=$1.2=£ 0.7. In terms of purchasing power e1 was approximately
equivalent to £ 1.
11Available online at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pm210/expsequencestechnical_and_data_appendix.pdf.
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experiment a screenshot with instructions appeared on each monitor, and at the same time
an experimenter read the instructions aloud to the participants.12 In each treatment, each
experimental subject was presented with 23 di¤erent screens. Each screen asked the subject
to choose the preferred one among a set of alternative remuneration plans in installments
to be received staggered over a time horizon of nine months, each consisting of e48 overall
(e24 in the PAYL treatment). It was explained that at the end of the experiment one screen
would be selected at random, and the preferred plan for that screen would be delivered to
the subjects.13 As usual, subjects were free to abandon the experiment at any point in time
(although no one did). The payment was not directly managed by the experimenters, but
through the accounts o¢ ce of the University of Trento, where subjects would pick up their
payment at the established times (and they would receive several reminders from the lab
before each date. All subjects have been paid). This procedure, which was explained to
the participants before the beginning of the experiment, was followed in order not only to
preserve anonymity with respect to the experimenters, but to provide a further guarantee
that payments will actually be forthcoming.14
Choices were based on two sets - depending on the number of installments - of four plans
each, namely an increasing (I), a decreasing (D), a constant (K) and a jump (J) series of
payments, over either two or three installments, as shown in Table 1.15 Though in both
cases payments extended over nine months, because of the di¤erent number of installments
we abuse terminology and refer to two-period(or also short) sequences and three-period
12The translation of the original instructions (in Italian) can be found in the appendix.
13Instructions were the same in all treatments, bar for one sentence, which in the HYP treatment claried
that choices were purely hypothetical, so that the only payment to be received would be the show up fee.
14This payment procedure is customarily used in the CEEL lab to pay participant. It is very di¢ cult to
rely on alternative payment methods, given that many students do not have current accounts and at any
rate the banking system in Italy is still highly bureaucratic. Using other instruments such as Paypal is more
costly (in Italy there is a charge to receive money, at least there was at the time of the experiment) and
anyhow electronic money transfer are highly disliked, as internet transactions are still not trusted in general,
and even more so at the time of the experiment. On the other hand, as the experimental lab has a long
tradition, we do not believe that issues of trust in receiving delayed payments were relevant. Observe further
that even if one were to assume that subjects did not trust us to pay them, all sequences have a front end
delay, so that there is no reasons to expect any one sequence to be preferred to any other on the basis of
subjects mistrust. Furthermore, if mistrust inuenced choice, there should be no di¤erences between the
PAY and the HYP treatment, whereas we nd to the contrary.
15The corresponding reward schedules for the PAYL treatment are obtained by dividing each amount by
two (e.g. the K2 sequence consisted of two equal payments of e12 each, the K3 sequence of three equal
payments of e8 each, and so on).
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(or also long) sequences rather than two/three-installment sequences.
Pairwise choices, which are the interest of this paper, were interspersed with choices
between larger sets of sequences (analysed elsewhere16). In fact each subject had to make
a selection from each possible subset of plans within each group (making up 11 choices per
group).
Two period sequences Three period sequences
I2 D2 K2 J2 I3 D3 K3 J3
in three months 16 32 24 8 8 24 16 8 in three months
16 16 16 8 in six months
in nine months 32 16 24 40 24 8 16 32 in nine months
Table 1: the base remuneration plans
Participants made their choice by clicking with their mouse on the button corresponding
to the preferred remuneration plan. Once made, each choice had to be conrmed explicitly,
so as to minimize the possibility of errors. Both the order in which the questions appeared
on screen and the position of each plan on the screen was randomised. Sample screenshots
are in gure 1.
Figure 1: Sample screenshots
16See Manzini and Mariotti [15].
12
4 The theoretical models and the experimental frame-
work
To make life harder for our proposed model, in this section we consider a simplied version
of the vaguenessmodel where we constrain the  function to be just a constant. We refer
to this two-parameter version as the (   ) model. Note that this restriction if anything
limits the ability of our model to t the data. Before deriving its predictions for choice in our
experimental setup, though, we review briey what the predictions of standard discounted
utility theories are in this context, since we will be comparing precisely these two classes
of theories. To distinguish them from the (   ) model, in which the primary criterion is
also based on discounting, we will refer to the large family of standard discounted utility
theories (which includes e.g. hyperbolic discounting) as pure discounting theories. As above,
we assume the utility over date-outcome pairs to be separable in the time and outcome
components, that is U (a; t) =  (t)u (a), and let the utility for a stream of date-outcome pairs
be given by U ((a1; t1) ; (a2; t2) ; ::: (ak; tk)) =
Pk
i=1  (ti)u (ai), i.e. additively separable. Let
u be monotonic increasing in outcome, concave and with positive third derivative.17 Finally,
let the discounting function be monotonically non increasing, i.e. t > t0 )  (t) 6  (t0).
Now x the times at which outcomes are received as 0, 1, 2, so that sequences can be
dened in terms of the ordered outcomes with no mention of the time at which each reward
is available. To reduce notation let u1 = u (8), u2 = u (16), u3 = u (24) and u4 = u (32);
and for the discounting function let  (0) = 0,  (1) = 1, and  (2) = 2. Also, normalize
the utility function u (by dividing it by 0) so that we can set 0 = 1. One important
caveat: the above notation is assuming implicitly that the monetary amounts accrued to
the experimental subjects as immediately consumed, and hence consider utility for money
directly (as opposed to mediated by consumption). A full discussion of this assumption is
deferred to section 6.
Let d denote the preference relation of a decision maker who discounts utility available
at time t by some discount function (i.e. a pure discounter). With the four three period
17Note that these are mild assumptions, satised by the most common functional forms used in economics
to describe an agents utility function, such as for instance the constant risk aversion class of utility functions.
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sequences described in the right hand panel of Table 1, any discounting criterion for choice
d should order them as either D d K d I d J or K d D d I d J . The choice
I d J holds since J shifts some outcome from the second to the last period while increasing
the sequence dispersion, so that any discounting criterion, paired with the concavity of the
utility function, is going to favor I over J . The choice between D and K also depends on
the shape of the utility function. We indicate each sequence by the letter and the number of
installments in which it was paid; for example J3 refers to the three period jump sequence
(when we do not want to emphasize the length, we just use the letters). Then, straightforward
manipulations yield that D is chosen over K whenever the discount factor is small enough.18
Secondly, regardless of sequence length, both D and K must be preferred to I, and the
latter must be preferred to J . Consequently the patterns of choice which can be observed
when a decision maker has utility for monetary streams which are additively separable and
who has a non-decreasing discount function are either of the following two:
 D d K d I d J , or
 K d D d I d J .
This is true even if the preferences of the decision maker conform to hyperbolic discount-
ing, since what matters is only the assumption that the discount function is monotonically
nondecreasing. For instance, in the case of the (   ) model we would have 1 =  and
2 = 
2, which would not a¤ect the analysis above.
Consider now the (   ) model. The primary criterion compares the present discounted
utility of monetary streams. As explained before, we impose strong conditions on the dis-
count function by letting t = 
t. We assume that the secondary criterion orders by increas-
ingness. For the simple sequences of payments K, I and D listed above, if a decision maker
is vague between any two sequences, by the secondary criterion it must be that
I 2 K 2 D (1)
18Formally, D3 d K3 , 2 < u3 u2u2 u1  L and D2 d K2 , 2 < u4 u3u3 u2  S . All the con-
ditions that follow derive from straighforward manipulations comparing the utilities from each reward




In general, putting both primary and secondary criterion together, easy manipulations
show19 that for the (   ) model, I can be preferred to either K or D provided that
the vagueness  is su¢ ciently high for the secondary criterion to kick in; similarly for a
preference of K over D. Moreover, the parameter values are such that they imply that
whenever a decision maker chooses D over K, it must be the case that he chooses K over
I and D over I. On the other hand, a choice of K over D imposes no such restrictions on
the choice between either I and K or I and D. In short, depending on parameter values, the
(   ) model can accommodate the following choices:
I2  K2,  > a I3  K3,  > A
I2  D2,  > b I3  D3,  > B
D2  K2,  < c D3  K3,  < C
where a, A, b, B, c and C are real numbers whose precise values depend on the utility
function and on the discount factor.20
As a nal point, note that the above rests on the assumption that subjects are risk averse
or neutral. This mild assumption is in accordance with previous experimental evidence (see
e.g. Andersen, Harrison, Mortensen and Rutström, [3]). Assuming risk loving behaviour
would only make the case against standard discounting models stronger, as e.g. no preference
for the constant sequence over the decreasing sequence could be explained.
5 Experimental Results
The sample consisted of 102 experimental subjects, roughly in equal proportions across
sexes.21 To indicate the choice of one plan over another we use the symbol, e.g. K2  D2
indicates that in two periods sequences, the constant one was chosen over the decreasing one.
We will use the and dnotation when discussing the predictions for choice behavior
19See http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pm210/elicitationoftimepreferences6_APPENDIX.pdf
for the full derivation.
20Full details are available at http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/~pm210/expsequencestechnical_and_data_appendix.pdf
21All the exact statistical analysis has been carried out usting StatXact, v.7. For a thorough reference on
exact methods in categorical data analysis see Agresti [2].
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according to the (   ) model and all pure discounting theories, respectively.
5.1 Aggregate data
Frequency distributions for binary choices involving the base sequences of payments I, K, J
and D are reported in Table 2. They show the following:
2 periods (%) 3 periods (%)
D chosen over K 66.7 64.7
D chosen over I 79.4 81.4
D chosen over J 90.2 84.3
K chosen over I 92.2 93.1
K chosen over J 89.2 91.2
I chosen over J 92.2 91.2
Table 2: Frequency distribution of binary choice, aggregate data (102 subjects)
1. Sequence length does not matter: the only di¤erence in binary choice behavior
when moving from two to three period sequences which is statistically signicant is
for the choice between J and D, where the proportion of subjects preferring J over
D increases from 9.8% to 15.7% (the p-value for the corresponding Mc Nemar test is
0.035). This seems to suggest that when the jumpaspect of the J sequences kicks
in (i.e. for the two period sequences J is simply steeper than I), it does a¤ect choice
behavior;
2. A majority of subjects prefers decreasing to increasing sequences: this is in
sharp contrast with the suggested preference for increasing sequences discussed in the
introduction;
3. A majority of subjects prefers rational to irrational sequences: the constant
sequence is preferred to both the increasing and the jump sequence more than 90%
of the times, and the decreasing sequence is preferred to both the increasing and the
jump ones, though somewhat less decisively (more than 80% of the times). Indeed,
regardless of length, the subjects who chose I over D are almost thrice as many as
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those choosing I over K22 (the corresponding proportions are 20.6% against 7.8% for
the short sequences and 18.6% against 6.9% for the long sequences);
4. Endpoint e¤ect? For the long sequences, subjects choosing the jump series over the
decreasing one are almost twice as many than those choosing the jump sequence over
the constant one23 (15.7% against 8.8%), whereas for the short sequences the frequency
is approximately the same (recall that for short sequences, J and I are in fact both
increasing, with the J sequence steeper than the I one. For long sequences, though,
the end e¤ect in the J sequence comes to the fore).
These data already suggest that decision making is unlikely to be guided by a clear-
cut discounted utility rule: choice of either the increasing or jump sequence over either the
constant or the decreasing one is a sign of irrationality, so that any individual choosing
the increasing sequence over either the constant or the decreasing sequence displays choice
behavior which is incompatible with pure discounting theories.
5.2 Checking theories
There are eight possible proles of choice generated by the three binary comparisons involving
the I, K and D sequences:
Prole 1: D  K  I;
Prole 2: K  D  I;
Prole 3: D  I  K  D (cycle);24
Prole 4: I  K  D;
Prole 5: K  I  D;
Prole 6: D  K  I  D (cycle);
Prole 7: I  D  K;
22This di¤erence is statistically signicant: a McNemar test of the di¤erence between the proportion of
subjects choosing I over K and those choosing I over D returns a p-value of 0.001 for the short and 0.002 for
the long sequences.
23This di¤erence is statistically signicant: a McNemar test of the di¤erence between the proportion of
subjects choosing K over J and those choosing D over J returns a p value of 0.046.
24Our observation that the proportion of subjects choosing I over D is much higher than the proportion
of subjects choosing I over K seems to indicate that A > B, so that the bottom portion of Figure 2 should
be the one that applies, i.e. we should expect to nd no subjects whose choices conform to prole 3. One
can proceed similarly for the two period proles, exchanging a for A, b for B and c for C.
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Prole 8: D  I  K.
The rst two proles are the only admissible ones in any model of pure discounting. As
for the (   ) model, recall from section 4 that:
I2  K2,  > a I3  K3,  > A
I2  D2,  > b I3  D3,  > B
D2  K2,  < c D3  K3,  < C
Since it is always the case that c < a; b and C < A;B, so that, as we mentioned already,
whenever a decision maker chooses D over K, he must also choose K over I and D over I.
On the other hand, a choice of K over D imposes no such restrictions on the choice between
either I and K or I and D.
In short, there are only ve (out of the eight possible) preference proles which are
compatible with the (   ) model, as in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Admissible choice proles in the (   ) model
The observed frequency distribution of the choice proles is reported in table 3. It shows
that there is a substantial proportion of subjects (around 18%) whose choice cannot be
accounted for by standard discounting theories, no matter how exible the functional form,
but that can be accommodated within the (   ) model. That is, looking at the proles
which are not common to the two approaches, there are substantially more observations in
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proles 3-5 than in proles 6-8 (18 cases in proles 3-5 as opposed to 5 or 3 cases in proles
6-8, depending on sequence length), suggesting at rst glance that standard discounting fails
proportionally more often than the (   ) model in explaining the data. As we will see,
this informal observation is conrmed by more careful statistical analysis below.
Choice proles Two period sequences (%) Three period sequences (%)
1: DKI 61.77 61.77
2: KDI 15.69 17.65
3: (DIK) 0.98 0.98
4: IKD 5.88 4.9
5: KID 10.78 11.76
6: (DKI) 3.92 1.96
7: IDK 0 0
8: DIK 0.98 0.98
Table 3: frequency distribution of choice proles for two and three period sequences, PAY
treatment (102 subjects)
Since for each subjects we observed choices in two alternative settings (i.e. long and
short sequences), it makes sense to check how many subjects made choices that conform
to the two broad families of theoretical explanations. to do so we must rst examine the
relationship that the two families of models postulate between choice proles in the two and
three period cases. In fact, the choice prole for sequences of a given length may determine
the choice prole for the sequences of other length.25 In particular, for the (   ) model
the juxtaposition of the two graphs for the choice proles in the case of two and three period
sequences reveals that a switch either from D  K  I to K  D  I or the opposite
switch from K  D  I to D  K  I with sequence length is possible. This point is
visualized in Figure 3.
In gure 3 we denote by i, with i = L; S, the critical value of the discount factor such
that c; C > 0. Then D is chosen over K in a i sequence (i.e. short or long) of payment
provided that  is su¢ ciently small (i.e.  < c and  < C, respectively). Since L  u3 u2u2 u1
and S  u4 u3u3 u2 , our assumptions on the concavity of the utility function imply that L < S
always. In the top panel of Figure 3, which applies whenever 2 2 (0; L), a (   ) decision
maker with  > c will exhibit the choice prole K  D  I when choosing among
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Figure 3: Choice proles over two and three period sequences compatible with the (   )
model
two period sequences, and the prole D  K  I when choosing among three period
sequences. An opposite switch will be displayed by an individual whose discount factor is
such that 2 2 (L; S), and for whom the value of  < c.
In contrast, only one of these switches is admissible according to pure discounting theories.
Recall that D is chosen over K if and only if the two period discount function is su¢ ciently
small, with the smaller threshold L applying to the case of three period sequences, and the
larger threshold S applying to two period sequences. We show this in Figure 4 below, only
the switch from D d K d I to K d D d I is possible when increasing sequence length.
Remarkably, then, despite the fact that the (   ) model is restricted to exponential
discounting, in this experimental setup it necessarily explains more choice proles than
any pure discounting theory allowed to use any form of discounting, including hyperbolic
discounting.26
26Obviously this is not the case in general.
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Figure 4: Choice proles admissible in discounting models
Turning now to the data, table 4 displays the cross-tabulation of the choice proles
observed in two period (columns) and three period (rows) sequences. Number in parentheses
refer to the overall percentage of cases. For legibility, diagonal observations (where no change
in choice proles is observed with sequence length) are in bold; groups of subjects whose
preference prole amount to at least 5% of the total are highlighted in italics. Combinations
of choice proles compatible with the (   ) model are underlined.
3n2 DKI KDI (DIK) IKD KID (DKI) IDK DIK Total
DKI 55 (53.9) 6 (5.9) 0 0 0 1 0 1 63 (61.8)
KDI 8 (7.8) 9 (8.8) 1 0 0 0 0 0 18 (17.6)
(DIK) 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 (1)
IKD 0 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 5 (4.9)
KID 0 1 0 3 7 (6.9) 1 0 0 12 (11.8)
(DKI) 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 (2)
IDK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DIK 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 (1)
Total 63 (61.8) 16 (15.7) 1 (1) 6 (5.9) 11 (10.8) 4 (3.9) 0 1 (1) 102 (100)
Table 4: choice proles for two and three period sequences, PAY treatment
The 6 subjects whose preferences fall in the (1, 2) cell cannot be accommodated within
any pure discounting model, nor can the other 24 subjects whose choice proles fall anywhere
in the table apart from the rst 2 by 2 submatrix.
All in all, then, about 30% of subjects (i.e. 30 out of 102) display a pattern of choice
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incompatible with any discounting model. To the contrary, only 8 subjectschoice behavior
is incompatible with the (   ) model.27
We summarize the ability of pure discounting theories and of the (   )model to explain
data in Table 5, where the proportion of subjects whose choices cannot be accounted in
standard and non-standard (e.g. hyperbolic) discounted utility frameworks is more than
three and a half times than in the (   ) model.
explained Unexplained Total
Any discounting 72 (70.6%) 30 (29.4%) 102 (100%)
(   ) model 94 (92.2%) 8 (7.8%) 102 (100%)
Table 5: explanatory power of competing theories, PAY treatment
Since the two models are nested, in order to compare di¤erences in explanatory power we
compute Seltens index of predictive success (see Selten [23]) for both of them. This measure
allows the evaluation of area theories, namely theories that exclude deterministically a
subset of the possible outcomes. Seltens index considers both the descriptive powerof the
model (measured by the proportion of observations consistent with the model being studied)
and its parsimony(i.e. the proportion of cases theoretically compatible with the model
under consideration): the lower the proportion of theoretically possible outcomes consistent
with the model, the more parsimonious the model.
In the case of the (   ) model one possible criticism of might be that the experiment
does not have enough power to reject its predictions even if it happened to be the wrong
mantained hypothesis. By introducing the parsimonyelement, Seltens measure would pick
up this problem. More precisely, the measure, denoted s, is expressed as
s = r   a
where r is the descriptive power (number of actually observed outcomes compatible with
the model divided by the number of possible outcomes) and a is the relative areaof the
27Arguments similar to those used in the main text to explain preference shift with sequence length can
be used to show that for the 3 subjects exhibiting the shift from I2K2D2 to K3I3D3, the change is
compatible with the (   ) model if 2 2  L;  and  2 (a;A). For the 2 subjects with the opposite shift
one needs 2 2  ;  and  2 (b; A). For the subject with proles (D2  I2  K2  D2) and K3D3I3 we
need 2 < L and  2 (a;A), and for the subject with choice proles I2K2D2 and (D3  I3  K3  D3)
we need 2 < L and  2 (b; B).
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model, namely the number of outcomes in principle compatible with the model divided by
the number of all possible outcomes. Selten argues that a theory is better than a competing
one if it has a higher value of the index s which combines hit rate and parsimony in a linear
way. The reason is pretty straightforward: one would expect a theory with lower parsimony
to be able to account for more observations, but one should weigh the gain in hit rate against
the cost in parsimony. At one extreme, a vacuous theory (i.e. one that cannot be falsied)
would have an index of zero, since it has a zero parsimony (i.e. a = 1) but also perfect hit
rate.
Seltens index of predictive success is particularly useful in the present context, where
the (   ) model can in principle explain more patterns of behaviour than the class of pure
discounting theories, and so is less parsimonious.
As we saw above, the class of pure discounting theories is compatible with three possible
congurations of choice over two and three period sequences out of the possible 84, while there
are eleven patterns of choice compatible with the (   ) model. That is, using subscripts
d and (   ) for the two theories we have ad = 384 = 0:047 and a( ) = 1184 = 0:172. The
data in Table 5 provide us with rd = 0:706 and r( ) = 0:922, so that Seltens indices are
sd = 0:659 and s( ) = 0:750.
This conrms the superior performance of the simple (   ) model with respect to the
whole class of standard discounting theories, even taking into account the parsimony of the
model rather than just its hit rate.
The distinctly larger predictive power of the (   ) model, even with restrictions on the
form of discounting used as primary criterion, as compared to conventional theories seem to
stem from the fact that, as shown in table 3, not all failures of the standard theories (proles
3-8) are observed in the same measure, with some of them being observed more often than
others. To pursue this point further, it is instructive to rearrange Table 3 as Table 6.Table 6 displays the cross-tabulation of choices involving the two rational sequences on the
one hand, and one irrational sequence on the other. In this way we can address the question
of whether or not departures from rationality are generated by independent mistakes, e.g.
tremblesat the moment of making a decision. Inspection of Table 6 makes it clear that
the answer is negative, as independence is strongly rejected; Fishers exact p-value is 0.001
(resp. 0.007). Indeed, in the top (respectively, bottom) panel, for the table on the left,
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D2K2 K2D2 D2K2 K2D2
I2K2 1 7 I2D2 4 17
K2I2 67 27 D2I2 64 17
D3K3 K3D3 D3K3 K3D3
I3K3 1 6 I3D3 2 17
K3I3 65 30 D3I3 64 19




the sample odds ratio28 is 0.057 (resp. 0.076). In other words, the odds of being rational
by preferring the constant over the increasing sequence of payments when the decreasing
sequence is preferred to the constant sequence are over 17 times (resp. 13 times) the odds
of being rational when the constant sequence is preferred to the decreasing one).
Observe the particularly counterintuitive nature of this association: the fact that K is
chosen against D makes it less likely that it will be chosen against I! This would be very hard
to explain in any preference ordering plus errormodel even with a special, non-independent
error structure. Similar patterns are found for the right-hand tables. In the right table the
odds ratio are 0.062 for the two-period sequences and 0.035 for the three period sequences.
Again independence is clearly rejected in both cases (Fishers exact p-values are 0.005 and
0.003).
In summary, subjects who make an irrational choice (either I over K or I over D) are
disproportionately concentrated among those who prefer the constant to the decreasing se-
quence.
According to pure discounting theories, any choice between K and D should give no
information about the distribution of the other binary choices. Thus if one were to cross-
tabulate the choice between K and D against the other choices, there should be no association.
Yet, consider table 7.The percentag of subjects choosing D over I and I over K, corresponding to the last
column in each of the tables above, is tiny (just 2 subjects for both sequence lengths, that is
less than 2%). On the other hand, the percentage of subjects choosing I over D and K over
28Recall that for the table the odds ratio is obtained as (w=x)(y=z) .
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I, corresponding to the second column in each of the tables above, is around 14% (15 and 14
subjects in the two and three period sequences, respectively). Of these, the overwhelming
majority (11/15 and 12/14) lies in the second row of each table, i.e. subjects who also prefer
the constant to the decreasing sequence. The e¤ect is stronger for the longer sequences
(where arguably the sequencefeature is more apparent).
Each of the cells in the two tables corresponds to one of the eight possible proles of
choice generated by the three binary comparisons involving the I, K and D sequences. Only
proles 1 and 2 are admissible in any model of pure discounting, and correspond to the rst
column in Table 7 above. Observations in any of the other cells of the columns could only be
due to mistakes. Yet, the association between rows and columns in Table 7 is immediately
apparent. In fact the Fisher-Freeman-Halton exact test strongly rejects the null hypothesis
of independence (the exact p-value is less than 0.001 for both tables). We conclude that no
model of positive discounting is compatible with our data.
But as we saw, on the contrary the association in Table 7 is to be expected in the (   )
model, as the choice between D and K is informative on the distribution of the other choices.
Conclusions in a similar vein can be drawn by analysing the cross-tabulation of the
choices involving one rational and one irrational sequence, as in by considering a Table 8
and 9 below. Again they reject the hypothesis that failures of rationality are due to random
mistakes.
Two period sequences
K2  I2, D2  I2 K2  I2, I2  D2 I2  K2, I2  D2 I2  K2, D2  I2
D2  K2 63 4 0 1
K2  D2 16 11 6 1
Three period sequences
K3  I3, D3  I3 K3  I3, I3  D3 I3  K3, I3  D3 I3  K3, D3  I3
D3  K3 63 2 0 1
K3  D3 18 12 5 1
Table 7: rational versus irrational sequences
Both Tables 8 and 9 display a strong association between choices between I and D and
between I and K. The sample odds ratios are 15.8 and 14.46 in Table 8 and 14.3 and 16.6,
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Two period sequences Three period sequences
I2  K2 K2  I2 I3  K3 K3  I3
I2  D2 6 15 I3  D3 5 14
D2  I2 2 79 D3  I3 2 81
Table 8: rational versus increasing sequences
respectively, in Table 9, with 95% exact condence intervals whose lower bounds are all above
2: in other words, the odds of choosing an irrational sequence over a rational one are at least
twice as large when an irrational choice has been made between a di¤erent rational/irrational
pair.29 Thus the hypothesis of independence in choices in the two situations can be rejected
(Fishers exact test yields p-values of 0.001, 0.002, 0.001 and 0.001). This suggests that
there is some systematic mechanism generating the irrational choices that makes irrational
choices in one context (e.g. I versus D) strongly associated with irrational choices in another
context (I versus K). Whatever this mechanism is, as we saw above it makes the proportion
of mistakesin the I versus D context signicantly higher than the proportion of mistakes
in the I versus K context (see footnotes 22 and 23).
6 Money, consumption, budget sets and choices
As already mentioned, our previous analysis assumes implicitly that the monetary amounts
accrued to the experimental subjects are perceived by the subjects as to be immediately
consumed when they become available. Since however we are only able to observe choice,
but unable to observe the subjects perceptions or even the consumption itself, it seems
reasonable to study the implications of considering the intertemporal budget sets that each
sequence of monetary rewards generates, and discuss the robustness of our previous analysis
to these considerations.30
In our experiment, subjects were asked to choose between alternative income streams, all
with the same total reward amounts. Any sequence front loaded with the higher payments
can be transformedinto one with larger later payments, so that the implicit experimental
29The four corresponding 95% exact condence intervals for the odds ratios are [2:42; 167:4], [2:03; 159:1],
[2:43; 80:3] and [2:86; 113])
30We are grateful to a referee for directing us to these issues.
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interest rate at which the various amounts can be traded o¤ is, in our experiment, zero. On
the other hand, considering opportunities outside the lab, experimental subjects could invest
all or part of their early monetary receipts to boost future consumption, or use all or part
of the future receipts as security towards borrowing to increase current consumption, thus
generating an intertemporal budget set. As shown by Cubitt and Read [6] in the context
of choices between alternative date-outcome pairs, if the experimental interest rate is either
larger or smaller than both the borrowing and the lending rates (with the former assumed
higher than the latter), choices might be uninformative: if the budget frontiers corresponding
to each date outcome pair are nested, then any standard textbook utility maximiser with
convex preferences will always pick the alternative that guarantees the larger budget set.
Extending the argument to the case of our sequences is straightforward, so that with
nested budget frontiers in our case, too, observed choice could be completely divorced from
time preferences. The budget sets induced by each sequence of rewards for the case of short
sequences are depicted in gure 6.
Two period sequences Three period sequences
J2 K2 K2  J2 J3  K3 K3  J3
J2  D2 5 5 J3  D3 6 10
D2  J2 6 86 D3  J3 3 83
Table 9: rational versus jump sequences
The sets delimited by the dashed lines are those induced by assuming the possibility
that subjects can borrow and lend (with borrowing rates higher than the lending rates).
In this case, though, we should still observe rational agents with convex preferences over
consumption goods to select D over K over I over J in both the case of long and short
sequences, while we dont.31 While we agree that this argument might be relevant in the
case of sequences of substantial payments, in our case the amounts and time intervals involved
are small enough that in practice anticipating that subjects would invest for six months their
extra e8 euros (and for a very small return, even brushing aside any transaction costs) seems
31See table 4, where only 55% of the subjects exhibit choice proles D  K  I in both short and long
sequences. If we consider also the J sequence, then the percentage of agents with the prole D  K  I  J
for both sequence lengths falls to 47%, leaving the majority of observed choices unexplained.
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very far fetched, and the possibility that they might lend this sum at an interest seems even
wilder.32
A possibility that seems more di¢ cult to rule out is that this money might be lent or
borrowed against in the informal market (e.g. friends). In this case however the money
would be exchanged without interest, which tallies with our implicit experimental interest
rate. All the sequences generate the same budget set, and lie strung along the (same) budget
frontier (the -45 degree line). This also implies that a textbookdecision maker with strictly
convex preferences cannot be indi¤erent between any two alternatives.
A second and more intriguing possibility is that subjects, unable or unwilling to borrow
against future experimental income, also ignore the interest they might earn outside the lab
by reinvesting what they earn inside it. Dealing with budget sets allows a decision maker to
pick an alternative that would allow him to select the exact consumption bundle that would
maximise his utility subject to the budget constraint. For instance, compare I2 and D2, and
suppose the agent wants to consume the increasing sequence (20; 28). He must still choose
D2 over I2 to achieve this.
To pursue this point further, consider a rational agent, i.e. an agent with convex prefer-
ence over consumption bundles who is intent in maximising his utility, whose preference for
money derives from wanting to spend it and who can freely hold money. Then sequence D2
must weakly dominate I2, K2 and J2, regardless of the agents time preferences. The reason
is that each of I2, K2 and J2 can be obtained from D2 by just holding money (assumed this
to be a costless activity) over the intervening period. For example, by keeping e16 euros a
subject with D2 can obtain I2. Whatever the optimal spending pattern for a subject with
I2, the very same pattern is also achievable with D2. So, there can be no reason to strictly
prefer I2 to D2 (for a rational agent who wants money for its purchasing power and can freely
hold it). Could it be that an agent chooses I2 over D2 because he is indi¤erent between the
two options? In this case our experimental subjects would be faced with the budget sets
delimited by the solid lines in gure 6.
So the budget set generated by the sequence D contains the one generated by sequence
32The possibility that the choice of experimental subjects may be driven by their consideration of invest-
ment opportunities outside the lab in the context of the elicitation of time preferences was rst highlighted
by Coller and Williams [5]. In their experiments, however, subjectschoices involved amounts upwards of
$500 (at 1990s prices).
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K, and so on. The convexity of preferences over consumption requires any agent that is
indi¤erent between I2 and D2 to be also indi¤erent between I2 and K2 and between K2 and
D2. Thus, conditioning on having chosen I2 over D2, we should expect no particular pattern
of choice in the binary comparisons between I2 and D2 and between K2 and D2. Yet, e.g.
for the case of the PAY treatment, this is what we observe:













More in general, since we are preventing our experimental subjects from expressing indif-
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ference between two or more options, we should be careful in our review of the data. Indeed,
the analysis of the previous section has shown the various associations between choices. Here
however we go back to those results to show them from a slightly di¤erent perspective to
address the issue of indi¤erence.
Consider the choice betweenK and D, and suppose the agent is indi¤erent between these
two alternatives, and only selects K because he is forced to a single choice. With convex
preferences, there are only two possibilities: either K is also indi¤erent to I; or both K and
D are strictly preferred to I. If the former, then it must also be that I is indi¤erent to D, so
that we should expect those subjects who chose K over D to more or less distribute evenly
in their choices between D and I and between K and I. Yet, inspection of the bottom rows
in the two panels in tables 7 reveals a pattern that is not random. Similarly, if both D and
K are strictly preferred to I, we should observe a concentration of choices in the bottom-left
cell of both tables, which in fact only contains around half of the observations.
Finally, consider the choice between K and I, again assuming that I is chosen over K
in spite of the decision maker being indi¤erent between these two options. A rational agent
should then be also indi¤erent between K and D and between I and D, while what we
observe is that most of those agents choosing I over K do not choose D in comparisons
involving either I or K.
To summarise, once the assumption that monetary receipts are immediately translated
into consumption is dropped, observing that in our experimental setup the implicit interest
rate was set equal to zero, the following considerations apply:
a. if subjects can freely lend and borrow on capital markets, or if, though unable to lend
and/or borrow, they choose to store money, then they face a kinked (or truncated)
budget constraint. In this case the choices of rational agents do not reveal anything
about their time preferences. However rational agents should in this case choose D
over K over I over J for both sequence lengths, and less than 50% of our subjects
display such behaviour.
b. if we allow subjects to lend and borrow on the informal market (e.g. from friends)
at no interest, then all choices induce the same budget constraint. The predictions of
the (   ) model appear consistent with relaxing the assumption that subjects are
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indi¤erent between two or more of the available plans.
To conclude, a caveat. In our simple setting assuming a generic preference for increas-
ingness as secondary criterion can be a reduced form for many alternative explanations: for
instance, choosing an increasing sequence as a commitment device not to spend it. What we
argued is that on its own a preference for increasingness explains very little of the data, and
the good newsis that the modal behaviour conforms to the standard modeling approach.
On the other hand, not only are a great deal of data left unexplained within the standard
approach, but we have also uncovered patterns of association in choice that are compatible
with the (   ) model and incompatible with alternative explanations, thereby reinforcing
the general theme that departures from pure discounting cannot be explained by random
errors.
7 Concluding remarks
We have proposed a simple model of choice between sequences of monetary rewards with
exponential discounting as one of its core elements, the other core element being a sec-
ondary heuristics. This hybrid modelwhich combines the traditional, consistent discount-
ing theory with a heuristics component, is very successful at explaining choices between time
sequences with an obvious trend (increasing, constant or decreasing). Neither a pure dis-
counting model (of any type) nor a pure heuristics model can explain the data well (though
discounting alone does much better than heuristics alone). Of course, our data do not pro-
vide specic support for the discounting component of the model: other theories, including
ones along the lines discusses in section 6, or perhaps hyperbolic discounting itself, might
also be used in conjuction with the secondary heuristics. The point we are making is rather
that, provided a secondary heuristics is used as we suggest, there is no need to modify
the discounting component in order to explain anomalies an observed associations between
choices.
Encouragingly, the general pattern of choice we have uncovered in our experiment is
consistent with data found elsewhere. Notably, in Gigliotti and Sopher [8], depending on
treatment, the choice proles of up to 80%-90% of their experimental subjects fall into the
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ve choice proles compatible with our (   ) model.
We conclude with a few comments on the context-dependenceof the secondary heuris-
tics. Does that mean that our theory is ad hoc, because we are free to tailor the secondary
criterion to the data set we are trying to explain? For example, we can use outcome or time
prominence when studying date-outcome pairs, we can use Pareto dominance when study-
ing Rubinsteins [22] experiment, and we can use sequence trend when studying sequences.
However, there is nothing specially ad hocabout this. As we have already remarked, at
the abstract level, our model departs from the standard choice theoretic model in just one
way, by positing two sequential incomplete (but transitive) preference relations instead of a
complete one (see Manzini and Mariotti [14] for a general model). So, the secondary criterion
is no more context-dependent than any preference relation is: di¤erent preference relations
will apply (by denition) to di¤erent sets of objects. We are not arguing here that di¤erent
rankings ought to apply to the same objects in di¤erent contexts (though we do not exclude
this possibility). Nonetheless, it is true that - because we interpret the secondary crite-
rion as a heuristic tied to some salient feature of the objects - it will generally be easier to
glean intuition about an individuals secondary criterion than about his general preferences.
We view this as a strength of the approach, since it makes the abstract model more easily
adaptable to specic circumstances.
From our perspective, the search to uncover the nature of the secondary heuristic in cases
di¤erent from those considered so far ought to be one of the main empirical developments
of the theory proposed in this paper.
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Please note: you are not allowed to communicate with the other participants for the entire
duration of the experiment.
The instructions are the same for all you. You are taking part in an experiment to study
intertemporal preferences. The project is nanced by the ESRC.
Shortly you will see on your screen a series of displays. Each display contains various
remuneration plans worth the same total amount of 48 Euros each, staggered in three, six
and nine months installments. For every display you will have to select the plan that you
prefer, clicking on the button with the letter corresponding to the chosen plan. (HYP: These
remuneration plans are purely hypothetical. At the end of the experiment youll be given
a participation fee of 5 e.) (PAY: At the end of the experiment one of the displays will
be drawn at random and your remuneration will be made according to the plan you have
chosen in that display).
In order to familiarise yourself with the way the plans will be presented on the screen,




3 e in one year
1 e in two years
1 e in three years
2 e in four years
Plan B
How much When
1 e in one year
2 e in two years
3 e in three years
1 e in four years
In this example plan A yields 7 e in total in tranches of 3 e, 1 e, 1 e and 2 e in a year,
two years, three years and four years from now, respectively, while plan B yields 7 Euros in
total in tranches of 1 e, 2 e, 3 e and 1 e in a year, two years, three years and four years
from now, respectively.
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